Basic german squad tactics
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The German entered the war with a system that was only slightly less complicated than the US design: 10-man squads divided into an MG troop and a rifle troop, with a squad leader over all. It is also likely that the Germans experienced at least some of the same problems as the GIs in the beginning, so by 1941 they had simplified the organization and workings of their "Gruppen". The following description applies to German tactics from 1943 on.
Although the 9-man (or before 1943, 10-man) squad was divided into a 3-man MG team and a 5-man rifle team with a squad leader over all, the division in the German squad was less distinct in the German unit. In fact, some German manuals ceased to distinguished between these two teams after 1941. The reason this came about was because the German squad leaders actually employed their whole formation as a single, large, MG team.
The important lesson that the German military thinkers brought out of WWI was that the machine-gun, not the rifle, was the primary killing weapon on the battlefield. This is one reason that they continued to equip their riflemen with the outdated Mauser bolt-action or the short-ranged machine-pistol; even though the well-developed German arms industry was capable of providing its riflemen with a more sophisticated long-arm, it did not because the MG was the only weapon in the infantry squad that mattered. The primary mission of the rifleman was to provide protection for the MG and help bring up ammo for it if necessary. The MG was also usually operated by one of the best men in the unit since the Landser squad leaders had instructions to place one of their steadiest soldiers behind it.
With the task of providing new weapons for the riflemen out of the picture, the considerable talents of the small-arms designers were concentrated on the development of an efficient light machine-gun. In doing this they really outdid themselves. First the MG34, then the MG42, and this last one was (and still is) a real lulu! Capable of belching out 1200 rounds per minute and being easily carried, operated, and maintained by a pair of men, the MG42 became the lynchpin of German tactics.
These tactics went something like this: the squad leader advances with his whole unit until contact is made; the MG then opens up on the enemy to achieve "fire superiority". If a good hosing down with this beast isn't enough to either destroy or run off the opposition, the whole squad would leapfrog forward in short rushes until the desired effect was achieved. In the event that the MG fire itself wasn't enough to finish the job, the gun would be used in a suppression mode as the riflemen went in to clean up with hand-grenades and the bayonet.
The squad leader in all this was better able to control the actions of his unit since his training decreed that during combat he be in the center of the squad. If for some reason the squad leader was separated or incapacitated, the squad could still be counted on to continue functioning aggressively. German infantry training stressed independent thinking for all of its soldiers; thus effective and opportunistic action was within the capability of any German group no matter how small or who was left in charge. This was also one reason why German units could suffer enormous casualties and still perform.
In summation, it seems that the German squad had the right weapons to achieve fire superiority and the right training and tactics to retain unit cohesion and the "will to combat". All of this would probably have sounded immaterial to the Landser who cowered under a shower of Allied shells, ran for the ditches under attack by the dreaded Jabos, or were hunted by groups of fierce Paratroops. But when small units of German and GI troops tangled, the difference in performance was often marked.
In contrast, most American squads were handicapped by an overly-complicated squad organization, lack of an effective automatic weapon, and the detrimental effects of the loss of unit cohesion cause by confusion or the loss of their leaders.
Although the 9-man (or before 1943, 10-man) squad was divided into a 3-man MG team and a 5-man rifle team with a squad leader over all, the division in the German squad was less distinct in the German unit. In fact, some German manuals ceased to distinguished between these two teams after 1941. The reason this came about was because the German squad leaders actually employed their whole formation as a single, large, MG team.
The important lesson that the German military thinkers brought out of WWI was that the machine-gun, not the rifle, was the primary killing weapon on the battlefield. This is one reason that they continued to equip their riflemen with the outdated Mauser bolt-action or the short-ranged machine-pistol; even though the well-developed German arms industry was capable of providing its riflemen with a more sophisticated long-arm, it did not because the MG was the only weapon in the infantry squad that mattered. The primary mission of the rifleman was to provide protection for the MG and help bring up ammo for it if necessary. The MG was also usually operated by one of the best men in the unit since the Landser squad leaders had instructions to place one of their steadiest soldiers behind it.
With the task of providing new weapons for the riflemen out of the picture, the considerable talents of the small-arms designers were concentrated on the development of an efficient light machine-gun. In doing this they really outdid themselves. First the MG34, then the MG42, and this last one was (and still is) a real lulu! Capable of belching out 1200 rounds per minute and being easily carried, operated, and maintained by a pair of men, the MG42 became the lynchpin of German tactics.
These tactics went something like this: the squad leader advances with his whole unit until contact is made; the MG then opens up on the enemy to achieve "fire superiority". If a good hosing down with this beast isn't enough to either destroy or run off the opposition, the whole squad would leapfrog forward in short rushes until the desired effect was achieved. In the event that the MG fire itself wasn't enough to finish the job, the gun would be used in a suppression mode as the riflemen went in to clean up with hand-grenades and the bayonet.
The squad leader in all this was better able to control the actions of his unit since his training decreed that during combat he be in the center of the squad. If for some reason the squad leader was separated or incapacitated, the squad could still be counted on to continue functioning aggressively. German infantry training stressed independent thinking for all of its soldiers; thus effective and opportunistic action was within the capability of any German group no matter how small or who was left in charge. This was also one reason why German units could suffer enormous casualties and still perform.
In summation, it seems that the German squad had the right weapons to achieve fire superiority and the right training and tactics to retain unit cohesion and the "will to combat". All of this would probably have sounded immaterial to the Landser who cowered under a shower of Allied shells, ran for the ditches under attack by the dreaded Jabos, or were hunted by groups of fierce Paratroops. But when small units of German and GI troops tangled, the difference in performance was often marked.
In contrast, most American squads were handicapped by an overly-complicated squad organization, lack of an effective automatic weapon, and the detrimental effects of the loss of unit cohesion cause by confusion or the loss of their leaders.
